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COMALENTAR Y
POSITING A RIGHT OF ACCESS: EVALUATIONS
AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS

MEDIA. By JEROME A. BARRON. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973. Pp. 352. $8.95.
TOM A.

COLLINS*

Theories of the first amendment guarantees of free speech and a free
press have been subjects of continual refashioning and redefinition.
Political, social, and technological developments of the past decade
again have forced reexamination of basic tenets and development of new
theories. Particularly significant is Dean Jerome A. Barron's thesis that
if freedom of speech and press is to continue as a viable concept, individuals must be afforded the right to compel access to the mass media.
Freedom of the Press for Whom? is an expansion of Dean Barron's
earlier essay on the subject' proposing that a right of access be created
by judicial decision interpreting the first amendment or by statute consistent with the first and fourteenth amendments. The book forcefully
presents this controversial and stimulating argument in a manner suitable
for a general audience, providing valuable insight into the function of
the first amendment in today's society.
THE

FUNCTIONAL PROBLEM

In considering an unusual approach to the first amendment such as
Dean Barron's, the initial inquiry should be whether and to what extent
societal developments require that doctrine be rethought. In the context of an argument for a right to compel access to the mass media, the
question is whether the media already cover, in one form or another,
all issues to an extent sufficient to expose them to the consideration they
merit. Dean Barron undertakes persuasively to establish that they do
not. Although his conclusion ultimately may be valid, it is an informed
subjective judgment not fully supported by data.
* A.B., Indiana University; J.D., Indiana University, Indianapolis; LL.M., University
of Michigan. Associate Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary.
I. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv.
1641 (1967).
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It is true, for example, that the process of selecting for publication
letters to newspaper editors2 is susceptible to a newspaper's bias and
that the most prestigious newspapers reject many more letters than
they publish. Selectivity, however, is necessary and, at least arguably,
is done with a degree of fairness.4 Seldom do editors totally suppress
ideas with which they do not agree, and editing of published letters
usually reflects an effort to preserve the essence of what was written.
In addition, one-sided reporting, a criticism offered by almost every
controversial figure, is not without justifying explanation. Reportage
reflects a strain of accepted opinion of varying width and intensity,
affected only partially by the editor's philosophy. Moreover, viable
journalism involves the presentation of ideas on the basis of a complex
evaluation of their potential merit, their degree of deviation from conventional thinking, their potential newsworthiness, and their manner
of presentation, including intellectual force and psychological appeal.
The problem is compounded by the media market Dean Barron posits.
The electronic media and newspapers of general circulation are presented as the overwhelming focal point of the discussion, while
neglected are the multitude of other means of communication, such as
rallies, leafleting, door-to-door canvasses, a waxing and waning underground press, ethnic and other special interest newspapers, and a broad
spectrum of magazines. Nevertheless, all of these vehicles have their
limits. It is easier to leaflet a college campus than a city of several
million, much less the entire country. Although the newsweeldies
remain potent forums, mass magazines of general interest are virtually
in total decline, replaced by special interest magazines, which, as a
result of the symbiotic relationship they hold with their readers, serve
generally not as vehicles for change but as forums for repetition of
ideas already held by their readers.
Dean Barron does, in a nine-page chapter entitled "Crime as a7
6
Forum," 5 discuss United States v. O'Brien and United States v. Kiger,
in which convictions for draft card burning were upheld over the
claim that such conduct was protected symbolic speech against the war
2. J.

BARRON, FREFOm OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?

THE RIGm

OF AccMss TO MASS

MEiDA 44-52 (1973).

3. Id. at 47.
4. Note, however, Dean Barron's discussion of two California newspapers which
refused to publish any letters to the editor on certain issues. Id. at 45.
5. Id. at 117-25.
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
7. 297 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 421 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
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in Vietnam. Casually overlooked, however, are other forms of communication utilized by critics of the war. The efforts of 1967 culminating in Senator Eugene McCarthy's declaration for the Presidency
were numerous, substantial, and clearly within the law-rallies, vigils,
teach-ins, picketing, and leafleting. Vhatever the source of their ability
to communicate, Senator McCarthy and his advocates were influential
in the decision of President Johnson not to seek reelection. Although
their position did not prevail with the electorate in November 1968,
the fact remains that initially unpopular ideas were widely communicated, received, and accepted, all to a large extent through forums
other than the mass media. When, however, in the spring of 1970, it
became obvious to critics of Vietnam policy that their ideas had not
received sufficient acceptance to be implemented despite wide exposure,
many, unlike Kiger and O'Brien who had employed arguably legal
means to communicate ideas then receiving insufficient access, engaged
in clearly illegal acts.8 It would thus appear that at least part of the
problem upon which Dean Barron posits the need for a right of access
to mass media results not from the lack of adequate forums but simply
from a lack of acceptance of unpopular ideas, notwithstanding sufficient opportunity to communicate those ideas.
These observations hardly defeat Dean Barron's thesis. He has taken
and pursued a position which is quite reasonable and very possibly
correct. Failure to put forth sufficient empirical data to support his
access argument is perhaps justified by the elusiveness of the concepts
and constructs embodied in its theory. Nevertheless, the need for a
firm empirical underpinning should be recognized by an advocate and,
particularly in this instance, pursued. 9 Courts understandably are leery
8. These acts included the widely publicized burning of buildings, ransacking of draft
board offices, disruptive conduct on college campuses in opposition to fighting in Cambodia, and the aftermath of the demonstration at Kent State University. The mass
media were, by this time, supplying wide exposure to all forms of protest, including
those clearly lawful.
9. Further information necessary fully to support Dean Barron's thesis includes a
realistic model indicating the source of the public's information; this would likely
require a study of the degree to which people turn to newspapers and television as
their sole source of information. Note, for example, the 1973 Harris Poll commissioned by the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, in which the
sampling indicated that the public depends "a great deal" on television news (65 percent) and newspapers (52 percent) for information on government and politics. 1973
Harris Poll, in BROADCASTNr,
Dec. 10, 1973, at 46. Second, there must necessarily be
a showing that nowhere in the public information sources is there sufficient access.
Clearly, the letters-to-the-editor studies and the stated policies of broadcasters lend
some support to Dean Barron's proposal, but these, too, must be pursued further.
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of accepting such extreme departures from traditional theory without
solid evidence of the need.' Legislators considering the statutory implementation of a right of access must have empirical data upon which
to base a decision of such magnitude. Until statistical evidence is forthcoming, the access argument, while continually gaining acceptance, is
unlikely to prevail except in limited circumstances, such as where the
existence of state action compels a right of access" or where a statute
is founded upon an especially strong basis in reason.' 2
THE JUDICIAL OPTION

Dean Barron's failure to foresee the judicial rejection of efforts to
create a right of access, while understandable, is a lamentable shortcoming of the book. He unfortunately relied upon the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Business

Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC' 3 that a broadcaster's

policy of summarily refusing paid editorial advertisements contravened
the first amendment. This decision was certain of review, especially in
the context of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner 4 and those of lower courts that state action is a prerequisite to
a right of compelled access. 1 The Court in Lloyd Corp., in holding
that the property rights of the owner of a shopping center were superior to the right of an individual to use the center's mall for leafleting
unrelated to the center's operation, shifted the emphasis of the access
inquiry from freedom of speech to private property rights:
The Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private property to public use. The closest
decision in theory [is] Marsh v. Alabama [326 U.S. 501 (1946)],
10. Compare Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., No. 43,009 (Fla. July 18,
1973), appeal granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 797) 'with Opinion
of the Justices, Mass. -,
298 N.E.2d 829 (1973). In Tornillo a Florida statute

requiring reply rights for attacked political candidates was upheld as part of a larger
scheme to prevent campaign abuses. Opinion of the Justices held contra with respect
to a similar proposed Massachusetts statute. See notes 45-62 infra & accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g 306 F. Supp.
1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).

12. See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., No. 43,009 (Fla. July 18, 1973),
appeal granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 797). For a discussion of

this case and the legislative approach to the access question generally, see notes 36-62
infra & accompanying text.
13. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System v.
Democratic Nat'l Committee, 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973).
14. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
15. See cases cited note 11 supra.
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...[where]

the owner of the company town was performing the

full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the
State. In the instant case there is no comparable assumption or
exercise of municipal functions or power.
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the
public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes ...
We ... say that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of

private property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights of
all citizens, must be respected and protected. The Framers of the
Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental rights of a
free society are incompatible with each other. There may be situations where accommodations between them, and the drawing of
lines to assure due protection of both, are not easy. But on the
facts presented in this case, the answer is clear.
We hold that there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to
entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First Amend16
ment rights.

The majority in Lloyd Corp. restricted Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza 7 and Marsh v. Alabama' to their facts;
the dissent' followed the broader rationale of Logan Valley and Marsh
to its ultimate conclusion. Reading the two opinions together and considering the requirement of state action imposed by lower courts in
access cases, it was manifest that the current majority of the Supreme
Court would reject an argument of a constitutional right of access to
newspapers on a private property theory and to broadcast media absent
a finding of state action. Nevertheless, Dean Barron elected to treat
Lloyd Corp. as an irritating aberration, 20 not the shift of philosophical
balance, however wrong or even transient, that it represented.
16. 407 U.S. at 569-70 (footnote omitted).
17. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Like Lloyd Corp., this case involved the question of access

to a large shopping center. The peaceful picketing in Logan Valley, however, concerned
a labor dispute with one of the stores, while the handbilling in Lloyd Corp. was
"unrelated to the shopping center's operations." 407 U.S. at 552. In distinguishing
Logan Valley, the Court in Lloyd Corp. stated: "Logan Valley extended Marsh ...
only in a context where the First Amendment activity was related to the shopping center's operations." Id. at 562.
18. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
19. 407 U.S. at 570-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. J. BARRON, supra note 2, at 104-07. Dean Barron analyzes the holding in Lloyd

Corp. as a result of the predilections of the "four new Nixon appointees," rather than
as sound constitutional doctrine. Id. at 106. The usage is pejorative in the same sense
that "Warren Court" has become a critical phrase when uttered by those who dislike
the constitutional philosophy of the Court under Chief Justice Warren.
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In any case, Business Executives' Move, reviewed by the Supreme
Court in Columbia BroadcastingSystem v. Democratic National Committee,21 ought to have been affirmed. First, although it is possible to
reconcile the result with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,22 the philosophical thrust of which is towards access, the cases require a more
rigorous distinction than the Court in Democratic National Co~mnittee
afforded. It is true that in Red Lion the Court focused upon the right
of the public to receive suitable exposure to ideas, not the rights of
broadcasters or of those who propound the ideas to present them: "It
is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or
by the FCC." 23 Similarly, in DemocraticNationalCommittee the Court
stressed a first amendment right to receive ideas, rather than a right to
communicate them. 4 It neglected, however, a fundamental proposition
underlying the issues in Red Lion and referred to in dicta 25 in that case
that an idea can best be presented by one who truly believes in it; in
other words, the most effective receipt of ideas results from their presentation by their staunchest advocates. Nor, more importantly, did
the Court in DemocraticNational Committee address the intense problem of where the ideas people have a right to receive will originate
if the 26
trustees of the airways do not present them or permit others to
do So.
Second, the Court in Democratic National Committee failed ade-

quately to refine the concept of state action and, indeed, thrust it into
considerable confusion; what was provided is but a series of plurality
holdings. 7 Most significant is the argument of Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, that Congress opted against
government control of broadcast media.2 ' The opinion, although eloquent, fails to refute the argument that state action, in a constitutional
21. 93 S. Cr. 2080 (1973).

22. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Red Lion put the stamp of constitutionality on the fairness
doctrine, which requires broadcasters to provide reasonable opportunity for the presentation of conflicting viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance. See J.
BARRON, supranote 2, at 127.
23. 395 U.S. at 390.
24. 93 S. Ct. at 2099-2101.
25. 395 U.S. at 392 n.18. The Court was here adopting a proposition first asserted
by John Stuart Mill.
26. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This case is discussed in J. BAmoRN, supranote 2, at 194-98.
27. See 93 S. Ct. at 2120-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2093.

1973]

COMMENTARY

sense, is inherent in a viable system of broadcasting. It may be conceded that scarcity of broadcast frequencies alone is not a sufficient
rationale for finding state action in government licensing of broadcasters,
since television and radio are no more scarce than newspapers; 29 in
fact, in an economic sense, barriers to entry to publishing in many
markets are as high as those to broadcasting.3 0 In the context of broadcasting, however, scarcity must be viewed in conjunction with the
phenomenon of interference among frequencies as compelling state
selection of broadcast licensees. It is this action of the state required by
scarcity and interference, and not the scarcity and interference themselves, which necessitates application to broadcast media of first amendment principles guaranteeing the public the right to receive a broad
spectrum of ideas.
Nor does the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger succeed in
distinguishing Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,31 in which the
Court held that approval by the Public Utilities Commission of the
District of Columbia of radio broadcasts on buses constituted state
action by the federal government contravening the first amendment
2
rights of passengers not wishing such broadcasts thrust upon them.
In Democratic National Comnittee, Chief Justice Burger implied that
there is less government control of broadcasting than of bus transportation because the government freely chose to involve itself in providing
transportation but was forced to become involved in broadcasting. 3
Any such distinction is irrelevant to the issue of state action. The
question which must be asked is whether the state does become entangled in the conduct of private activities, not whether it wants to
become involved. Inasmuch as the broadcasting industry not only is
molded to a substantial degree by government regulation but also could
not exist without it, especially in deciding who may broadcast, 4 there
is state action. Although actually an unwilling and, to a degree, unwanted agent of the public interest, the licensee is denominated a public
trustee3 Any lack of desire for involvement on the part of the state
29. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969).
30. See, e.g., Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & EcoN. t
(1959); Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 433 (1968); Levin,
Federal Control of Entry in the Broadcasting Industry, 5 J. LAW & EcoN. 49 (1962).
31. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
32. Id. at 462.
33. 93 S. Ct. at 2086-92.
34. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969).
35. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 93 S. Ct.
2080, 2093-94 (1973).
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cannot negate the necessity of that involvement to the existence of a
broadcast industry.
THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH

The possibility of statutory resolution of the access problem is much
more sanguine. Dean Barron argues that section five of the fourteenth
amendment empowers Congress to enact legislation creating a right of
access3 6 That the fourteenth amendment would support such legisla7
tion, if the first amendment permits it, is beyond serious disputeY
What has been troublesome about such legislation is its administrative
feasibility, a focal point of attack upon the idea of access generally.
A bill drafted by Dean Barron appears eminently workable.38 Under
its terms, the right of access is restricted to newspapers of general
circulation; reliance presumably is placed upon FCC action for application of the right to broadcast media, although the proposal is silent on
this point. The bill requires newspapers to accept an editorial advertisement at going rates if no newspaper in the area will accept it voluntarily, as well as to grant space for reply to persons and organizations
who have been subject to comment. The right of access would be
enforceable by mandatory injunction in the federal courts.
Although the terms "newspaper of general circulation" and "organization" as used in the bill lack a certain precision, they and other
terms are defined adequately to" enable courts to act confidently in
reaching decisions and adding specificity. The bill does, however, leave
open the question of liability of a newspaper for defamation in material
it is required to publish; presumably such liability could be removed, as
is done for broadcasters under section 315 of the Federal Communication Act. 9 No other major problem appears, and any that might arise
would be amenable to the traditional equity power of the courts.
Assuming, as one must, that good faith compliance would follow determination of the legislation's constitutionality, Dean Barron's bill satisfies the major burden of establishing practicality.
The judicial attitude toward such legislation appears encouraging.
36. J. BArRoN, supra note 2, at 67-68.

37. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
38. Truth Preservation Act, H.R. 18941, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill is
reproduced in J. BARRoN, supra note 2, at 55-58.
39. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360
I.S. 525 (1959).
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A Supreme Court decision on defamation ° cited with approval 1 Dean
Barron's seminal article on access '2as stating a possible basis for modification of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan43 doctrine. Moreover,
the Court in Democratic National Committee, after finding an absence
of congressional intent in the Federal Communications Act to require
access, specifically left open the question of the validity
of either an
44
FCC rule or congressional enactment requiring access.
In Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,45 the Florida Supreme

Court recently upheld a long-neglected Florida statute creating reply
rights for attacked political candidates.46 In so doing, it generally accepted the argument of Dean Barron, who was on the prevailing brief,
that the continued concentration of the press jeopardizes "[(t]
he right of
the public to know all sides of a controversy and . . .to be able to
make an enlightened choice ... . 47 To protect the public's right to

information, the argument continues, the absolute power of private
censorship must be restricted. 48 Doing so prohibits nothing, "but rather
...requires,

in the interest of full and fair discussion, additional infor-

mation." 40 Thus, the affirmative use of state power to require access
vindicates, rather than restricts, first amendment rights, since providing
40. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), in which the Court held that
an individual cannot recover damages for libel against a radio station if the context in
which he allegedly was defamed was such as to make him a subject of the public interest.
41. Id.at 47 n.15.
42. Barron, supra note 1.
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court in Sullivan held that a newspaper has a qualified
privilege to defame public officials with respect to their official conduct and is liable for
defamation in such case only upon a finding of actual malice. See also Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
44. 93 S. Ct. at 2100-01.
45. No. 43,009 (Fla. July 18, 1973), appeal granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1974) (No. 797).
46. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
If an), newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said
candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attackshis official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such
newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free,
of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the
same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such,
reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any person
or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guiltyof a misdemeanor of the first degree ....
FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1965).
47. No. 43,009 (Fla. July 18, 1973), at 6.
48. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
49. No. 43,009 (Fla. July 18, 1973), at 6.
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the opportunity for full and robust debate of all issues without public

or private censorship fulfills the mandate of the Constitution.
Although a concurring opinion in Tornillo found Democratic National Committee inapposite because it was grounded upon the scarcity
of broadcast time for sale as advertising as well as the protection
afforded by the fairness doctrine,o the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in an advisory opinion to its state legislature that a proposed bill requiring access to newspapers would be unconstitutional,
concluded otherwise. 51 Rather than relying on Chief Justice Burger's
plurality opinion in Democratic National Committee, which found no
state action, the Massachusetts court based its opinion on two concur-

rences and a dissent in that case. Justices Douglas5 2 and Stewart," in
concurrence, refused to impose upon the electronic media burdens they
found unconstitutional for the printed media. Justice Brennan, in a
dissent in which Justice Marshall joined, found a basis for access pre-

mised on state action in the electronic media, whereas, he stated, in
the printed media no state action exists and thus no right of access can

be compelled. 4 The Massachusetts court also emphasized language from
dissenting opinions in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations,1 in which the Supreme Court upheld a prohibition
of sex-designated commercial advertising. Rejecting the reasoning of
the majority, Chief Justice Burger continued the concept of "protected
journalistic discretion" 56 which he had first advanced in Democratic
National Committee,57 and Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Douglas
and Blackman agreed in this particular, asserted that the government
cannot "tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it
cannot." 58
The decision in Democratic National Committee and the views of
the dissenters in PittsburghPress clearly are inapposite to the question of
validity of a statutory right of access; indeed, other decisions of the
Supreme Court provide sound support for the decision in Tornillo. The
scarcity which does exist in the electronic media, the adequate minimal
protection provided by the fairness doctrine, and only a general first
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
.58.

Id. at 13-15 (Roberts, J., concurring).
Opinion of the Justices, - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 829 (1973).
93 S. Cr. at 2109.
Id. at 2101.
Id. at 2120, 2131-36.
93 S. Ct. 2553 (1973).
Id. at 2563.
93 S. Ct. at 2097.
93 S. Ct. at 2566 (dissenting opinion).
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amendment theory, rather than specific statutory authority, were factors

present in DemocraticNational Committee. PittsburghPress dealt with
an exclusion, not an inclusion, and thus was censorship (in the view of
Justice Stewart in dissent), not a promotion of robust debate. The
Tornillo decision, on the contrary, creates safeguards for and promotes
robust debate, prime values stressed by the Supreme Court in New York

Times Co. v. Sullivan 9 and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 0°

A final consideration involves the support for the Florida statute in
legislative findings of campaign abuses,"' to which the statute is directed;
apparently no such justification was advanced for the proposed Massachusetts bill. 2 The Florida statute ought to survive judicial scrutiny.
The same should be true of a well-drawn bill such as Dean Barron's,
provided it, too, is supported by a legislative finding of necessity.
FURTHER COMMENTS ON COMMUNICATIONS

THEORY

Some observations on other aspects of Dean Barron's book are in
order. A substantial portion of the work is devoted to communication
policies which are interesting but only tangentially germane to the
problem of access.
The discussion of citizen group and rival applicant entry into the
process of license renewal" does not add a significant aspect to the book,
but rather leaves the reader with an optimistic, bitter-sweet-we are
winning even though we are losing some-feeling of the progress of
such groups. Unfortunately, progress is not being made. Those seeking
entry have a hard position to establish. Hale v. FCC,4 the KSL-AM
case, which is fully discussed by Dean Barron,' 5 illustrates the problem.
Virtually impossible procedural requirements for a petition to deny
renewal of a radio station license were imposed, including the pleading
with specificity of the facts establishing the alleged violation; such a
requirement could well entail an analysis of the entire programming
for the period in controversy. Nor is Brandywine Main-Line Radio,
Inc. 3 much more encouraging. Although the FCC premised license
59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See note 43 supra.
60. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See notes 40-43 supra & accompanying text.
61. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co, No. 43,009 (Fla. July 18, 1973), appeal
granted,42 U.S.L.vV. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 797).

62. Opinion of the Justices,

-

Mass.-, 298 N.E.2d 829 (1973).

63. J. BARRON, supranote 2, at 194-208.
64. 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
65. J. BARRON, supranote 2, at 226-32.

66. 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), aff'd, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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revocations of WXUR-AM and FM on violations of the fairness doctrine, 7 alternative grounds for revocation because of false statements
of the licensee were set forth. " ' The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, while arguing the complex fairness doctrine question at great length, 69 affirmed on the less difficult basis of misrepresentation in the application. °
The same court in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC71 failed
to improve the rival applicant position which the FCC threw askew
after the WHDH case 72 and the uproar caused by Senator Pastore's
7
recommendationsY.
The FCC not only has made preliminary remarks
74
evidencing an attempt to avoid requirements established by the courts
but also has rendered a decision 75 which makes clear that it views the
major factor in licensing proceedings to be the preservation of the status
quo ante. Although these efforts of the FCC doubtless will be challenged, optimism is difficult. Delay and attrition aid the established
industry position and the acquiescent agency, not the citizen advocate
seeking reform.
Two other topics considered by Dean Barron, the treatment of
which deserve particular comment, are CATV, or cable television, 7 6
which receives short shrift, and objectionable presentations, 77 to which
Dean Barron attaches much significance but fails thoroughly to explore.
Although cable television is recognized by Dean Barron as a potential, and indeed likely, source of access, cursory treatment is afforded
67. 24 F.C.C.2d at 22.
68. Id. at 28-32.
69. 473 F.2d 16, 40-48 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70. Id. at 50-52.
71. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
72. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), aff'g 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969). In this case, the renewal of the
license of a Boston television station owned by one of the city's newspapers was refused
by the FCC in favor of a rival applicant who successfully argued that the public would
be better served, and the FCC policy of diversification of media ownership better
enforced, by granting the license to an independent voice. See J. BARRON, supra note 2,
at 132-33, 210-13.
73. Senator Pastore introduced a bill to amend the Communications Act to require
a comparative hearing for license renewals between the present licensee and rival
applicants only after a finding that the incumbent licensee was not serving the public
interest. See J. BARRON, supra note 2, at 213-14.
74. See In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant,
Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 27 F.C.C.2d 580 (1971).
75. In re WTAR Radio-TV Corp, 27 P &F RADio REG. 1 (March 15, 1973).
76. J. BARRON, supra note 2, at 249-69.
77. Id. at 270-303.
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whereas detailed consideration is necessary. How, for example, will the
fairness doctrine and the general public interest criteria attach to cable
television? May they, indeed, attach in a constitutional manner? In
a sense, access to cable television will resemble a return to colonial
America in that everyone can have his say, just as everyone could have
a printing press, without everyone having to receive the presentation.
Rather than merely noting that a firm doctrine of common carrier access
does not exist, the framework of potential obligations ought to be
examined. Problems of concentration of ownership are discussed
thoughtfully, but not fully resolved. Since cable television has generated a massive amount of literature, Dean Barron's failure thoroughly
to survey the topic is not critical. Nevertheless, after the brilliant resolution of the general problem of administering a right of access in the
discussion of his proposed bill, the failure to consider in more depth the
perplexing problem of cable television is disappointing.
Although the matter of objectionable presentations needs to be explored, the bare recital of the problem, ending with the conclusion
merely that access for objectionable material should not be denied, adds
little. The analysis is restricted to the context of radio and television,
presumably because the cases are there and an analogy for printed
media is assumed. Dean Barron fails to come to grips with the real
problem-that programs projected into the home are perceived to be
unavoidable by those who wish to avoid them. The problem is even
more intractable following Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,78 in which
the Supreme Court held that obscene material can be denied consenting
adults even in a theater which advises potential patrons of its wares,
and the brace of cases79 which, by prohibiting transportation of obscenity and, by strong presumption, its communication, limited the
protection of Stanley v. Georgias° to obscene material already possessed in the home. While the problem of objectionable presentations
deserves treatment, any undertaking to do so should be thorough.
CONCLUSION

Too much has happened since publication of Freedom of the Press
for IVhom? to hold Dean Barron precisely to his assertions. The work
78. 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
79. E.g., United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels
of Super 8mm. Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).

80. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Court in Stanley held that in the privacy of the home,
one is immune from prosecution under state obscenity laws.
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is a very lucid and readable exposition of the Barron thesis of access,
which has contributed fruitfully to first amendment thought. Although
its shortcomings emphasize the need for more empirical research to
support its thesis, as well as for development of alternate theories of and
means to support and implement a more functional first amendment in
contemporary America, the book provides an excellent starting point
in the effort to reconcile traditional first amendment goals with our
present circumstances.

